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Market Competition, Institutions, and Contracting Outcomes: Preliminary 
Experimental Results 
 
This paper presents a preliminary model and experimental results concerning how 
institutions and market power may affect contracting outcomes.  Some policy makers and 
farm advocates have expressed concern that increasing consolidation of large 
agribusinesses has eroded the bargaining power and profitability of many farmers that are 
under contract with processors.  Among the issues that have received attention include 
alleged opportunistic behavior by processors and the difficulty of verifying whether the 
obligations of contracting parties have been met.  In this paper, we examine the potential 
impact of market concentration and contracting institutions on the nature of contracting.  
We first develop a microeconomic model of contracting under two enforcement 
environments and then vary the degree of market concentration to determine how 
efficiency and the distribution of surplus is impacted.  We then test our predictions using 
experimental economics.     
  We develop a preliminary theoretical model under the assumption that people 
have the option of engaging in one-shot contracting or forming relational agreements 
through repeat trading.  We believe these assumptions are consistent with the contracting 
environment in agriculture.  We assume people structure contracts to enforce promises 
made by all contracting parties. These obligations can be either third-party enforceable or 
can be self-enforcing via a relational contract based on a reputation based, perfect 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium that imposes sequential rationality on the parties.   Assuming 
that the parties are sufficiently patient and are reasonably optimistic about the existence 
of “cooperative” types in the population that will honor contracts even in the last period 2 
 
of a finitely repeated game, even purely self-interested parties will honor the contract on 
the equilibrium path, and the parties revert to the no trade outcome and receive their 
reservation payoffs if they fail to honor their obligations.   
  We derive the optimal contracts under two enforcement environments.  We show 
that when contract enforcement is perfect, then the optimal contract that maximizes joint 
surplus is a complete contract that enforces all relevant obligations.  However, when 
enforcement is imperfect, incomplete contracts are unavoidable.  Nonetheless, we find 
that there is an optimal degree of incompleteness that leaves only enough gaps in the 
contract to balance discretionary flexibility across parties.  However, the principal always 
prefers a contract that provides her with maximum discretionary flexibility. In other 
words, she prefers a contract that is more incomplete (in a direction that is favorable to 
the principal) than what is socially optimal.  Intuitively, she can use her flexibility to 
either to reward or punish the agent, or more negatively, to extract rents from the agent.   
When concentration in favor of the principal is added, the principal has more leverage to 
implement contracts that exceed the optimal degree of incompleteness. Our model may 
explain why many agricultural contracts are silent on important obligations, such as when 
technological upgrades are to be made or when pay rates can be adjusted, leaving these 
obligations largely to the discretion of the processor.   
  We test our predictions using experimental economics.  The experimental design 
involves trading between subjects that are randomly assigned to be buyers (processors) 
and sellers (growers) of an abstract good.  Buyers and sellers trade across many identical 
trading periods where in each trading period, buyers can endogenously offer a range of 3 
 
possible contracts in order to trade a unit of good that varies in quality.  A typical contract 
includes obligations such as payment terms, which includes a fixed price P and possibly 
incentive bonuses or deducts to be made by a buyer, and quality, Q, to be produced by the 
seller.  Thus, a contract is a price-bonus/deduct-quality triplicate, (P, B/D,Q) of mutual 
obligations which a seller can accept or reject.  We allow buyers to endogenously choose 
whether to include some or all of the obligations in a contract and to determine whether 
obligations are “binding”.  A binding obligation (enforced by the computer) is analogous 
to a legally enforceable obligation, which means the party responsible for the obligation 
has no latitude to deviate from the obligation ex post.  If an obligation is included but not 
binding, then there is latitude to deviate.   
  We include four treatments.  In treatment RS1, Q can be made binding and there 
is a balanced number of buyers and sellers. This mimics an environment where contracts 
can be perfectly enforced and there is no concentration.  Treatment RS1B is the same as 
RS1 except there are fewer buyers and sellers so that there is concentration in favor of 
buyers.  Buyers have more bargaining power as some sellers will be unemployed.  Next, 
treatment RS2 is the same as RS1 except Q can no longer be made binding.  That is, Q 
cannot be enforced by a third-party so contract enforcement is imperfect.  Finally, 
treatment RS2B is the same as RS2 except buyers have more bargaining power. 
  Our preliminary experimental results suggest that sellers are more reluctant to 
accept highly discretionary contracts that are stacked in favor of buyers.  However, 
adding market power increases sellers’ willingness to accept all classes of contracts and 
therefore allows buyers to implement unbalanced contracts.  These contracts increase 4 
 
buyers’ profits while decreasing sellers’s profits.  They also increase the incidence of rent 
seeking where buyers use their discretion to extract profits from sellers.  Indeed, our 
experimental results show that a significant fraction of sellers earned profits that fell 
below reservation levels under highly discretionary contracts. Efficiency-wise, when 
contracts are not third-party enforceable so that buyers always have discretion, then 
contracts that provide buyers with partial discretion are more efficient than contracts that 
provide buyers with either too little or too much discretion. 
A Simple Model of Contracting 
This section develops a simple, two period contracting model between a contractor 
(buyer/processor) and contractee (seller/supplier) in order to generate some testable 
hypotheses.  While the model may appear simple, its insights can be easily generalized to 
T periods.  A more general model is presented in a more complete companion paper by 
MacDonald and Wu (2009).   
  Suppose that a buyer and seller can potentially trade one unit of a good with a 
quality index  [,] qq q ∈ , where q is observable but may or may not be third-party 
enforceable.  When a contracting institution exists to verify and enforce q, then complete 
contracting is possible.  However, if the contracting institution is imperfect or missing, 
then neither q  nor payments that are contingent on q can be made legally binding in a 
contract.  The lack of third-party enforceability is a realistic assumption in agricultural 
contracting as growers often complain about the lack of third-party verification of 
performance outcomes.   5 
 
  If trade occurs at some price, p, along with a bonus, b, then the payoffs to the 
buyer and seller are  () R qp b π =− −  and  ( ) Up b c q = +− .  The revenue function, ( ) R q , 
obeys  () 0 Rq= ,  () 0 Rq ′ >  and  () 0 Rq ′′ ≤ .  The cost of producing a good of quality q is 
() cq, where  () 0 cq = , ( ) 0 cq ′ >  and  ( ) 0 cq ′′ ≥ .  Hence, the buyer and seller’s profits 
from exchange are functions of q.  If no trade occurs, then the buyer earns π   and the 
seller earns a reservation payoff of u  .  Think of these payoffs as expected profits from 
finding a different trading partner.  Social surplus is then given by 
() () SR qc qu π =− − −  .  Assume  () 0 () Sq Sq >=  and  () () R qc q ′ ′ ≥ , [,] qq q ∀ ∈ , so that 
trade at qq =  is socially efficient. 
  The timing of a one-shot trading (stage) game is as follows.  At time 0, the buyer 
can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller.  The contract may specify a base price, 
P, a bonus B, and/or quality, Q.  At time 1, the seller decides whether to accept or reject 
the contract.  If the contract is rejected, the parties find other trading partners and earn 
expected payoffs π   and u  .  If it is accepted, the parties move to time 2 where the seller 
chooses actual quality q, which may not equal Q, since quality is third-party enforceable 
(i.e. binding).  At time 3, after q is observed, the buyer chooses actual price, p which may 
differ from P if price is not third-party enforceable.  If a bonus B was specified, then it is 
paid if qQ ≥  when B is binding.  Otherwise, the buyer may choose to withhold a bonus 
or choose some bB ≠ .  For simplicity and to economize on notation, we will just assume 
that a seller honors the contract by delivering qQ =  as opposed to qQ ≥ . 
Q Third-Party Enforceable 6 
 
When contracting institutions exist to monitor Q and make it public information so that it 
can be enforced by a third-party, then the optimal contract can be derived from the 
following problem: 
(1)  ()
,, max ( )
QPB R QP B −−      s.t.  () PBc Q u + −≥   
This problem states that the principal chooses contract terms Q, P, and B, in order to 
maximize profits subject to the constraint that the agent is willing to accept the contract.  
To solve the problem, note that a profit maximizing principal would never leave the agent 
with rents so that one can assume that the participation constraint is binding and 
substitute it into the principal’s objective function to get: 
(2)  () max ( ) ( )
Q R Qu c Q −−  
which gives the first-order condition: 
(3)   () () 0 RQ cQ ′′ −= . 
By assumption,  ( ) ( ) R Qc Q ′′ ≥   [,] Qq q ∀∈ so the buyer’s requested Qqq = = .  With Q in 
hand, it is easy to recover  () Ppc qu == + to induce the seller’s participation.  Note that 
B=0 as its inclusion would be redundant since it would play no incentive role.  This is 
because Q can be directly specified into a contract and enforced by a third-party such as a 
court.  Assume that any deviation from Q by a buyer would trigger a court mandated 
punishment that is sufficiently severe to deter shirking.  Note that since this contract 
induces acceptance (participation satisfied) and Qqq = = , it is fully efficient.  No other 
contract would yield higher surplus.  One can of course, construct an equally efficient 
complete contract by not specifying Q directly, but including a bonus that satisfied the 7 
 
agent’s incentive compatibility constraint; that is,  () () B cq cq ≥−.  In this case, the court 
would enforce B rather than Q but either contract leads to the same result.  Finally, the 
role of repetition from the repeated game matters little with perfect enforcement as repeat 
trading is not necessary to provide self-enforcement of obligations. 
Proposition 1: When q can be perfectly and costlessly enforced by a third-party, then the 
contract that directly specifies Qqq = =  and  () Ppc qu = =+ is optimal. 
Proposition 1 predicts that with perfect contracting institutions, we should observe the 
efficient outcome and the agent should earn no rents.    
 
Q not Third-Party Enforceable 
When Q is not third-party enforceable, then a full reputation perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
can be used to provide self-enforcement of either Q, or B (the bonus is contingent on 
quality).  The reputation equilibrium assumes that there are two types of players: (1) 
those that are cooperative and therefore honor their contract agreements, and (2) strictly 
self-interested players who will shirk on the bonus and price unless it is in their self-
interest not to do so.  Assume that the strategy space of the cooperative type is restricted 
so that they either honor their obligations when the other party has not shirked, and shirk 
if the other party has shirked.  Using the logic of Kreps, et. al. (1982) and Healy (2007), a 
repeated game can provide incentives to selfish buyers to make their payments in all but 
the final period of a finitely repeated game.  In essence, selfish buyers “mimic” 
cooperative buyers to preserve their reputation. To keep things simple, we restrict the 
analysis to a two period repeated game, though results generalize easily to the T period 8 
 
case.  Moreover, it is assumed that the buyer can endogenously choose the contract to 
incorporate greater or lesser degrees of discretion by choosing to either make P “binding” 
by making it legally enforceable, or by relying on an informal handshake agreement 
about P.  Under a handshake agreement, the buyer has the discretion of “going back on 
his word” and deviate on promised payments.  Note that even if contracting institutions 
such as efficient and unbiased courts do not exist, one can easily mimic perfect 
enforcement of P through an upfront payment of P.  Note that it is not possible to make 
the terms Q and B binding given the unenforceability of Q.  There are three possible 
contracts with varying degrees of discretion (1) a repeat purchase mechanism (RPM) 
which guarantees a price P across all contingencies and specifies no bonus; (2) a 
discretionary bonus contract which guarantees a base price of P; and (3) an “illusory 
promise” or a handshake agreement which only informally promises a payment in 
exchange for a quality level Q.    
  We will now analyze a discretionary bonus contract and then discuss how results 
are affected under the other two contracts.  The two-period repeated game is analyzed by 
backward induction.  Starting in the second and final period, note that the stage-game of 
this repeated game is a sequential move game with the buyer being the last mover.  
Backward inducting within the stage game, note that a selfish buyer will renege on any 
promised bonus, B, even if the seller delivers  22 qQ = , where all subscripts denote the 
period.  Backward inducting to the seller’s move, assume that the seller’s belief  that a 
buyer is of a cooperative type is  (0,1) h∈ .  The seller will honor the contract by 9 
 
delivering  22 qQ =  only if her expected payoff from doing so exceeds her payoff from 
breaching the contract, 
(4)  [ ] [ ] 22 2 2 2 2 ()( 1 ) () ( ) hP B cQ h P cQ P cq +− + − − ≥−  
where the subscript refers to the second period.  Letting the inequality bind and solving 










=   
which implies that the seller will meet contractual obligations if beliefs are sufficiently 
optimistic such that  b hh ≥ .  Backward inducting further to the buyer’s contract offer 
stage, note that for a given belief, h, which is assumed to be common knowledge, the 
buyer’s optimal bonus offer just satisfies the incentive compatibility condition, 
(6)  2





to induce the seller to choose high quality. In order to induce the seller to accept the 
contract, the buyer’s choice of P  must satisfy the seller’s participation constraint, 
(7)  [ ] [ ] 22 2 () ( 1 ) () hP B cQ h P cQ u +− + − − ≥   
which, combined with (6), yields, 
(8)  2 () Pu c q =+   
where equality is assumed because the buyer would not pay more than necessary to 
induce participation.   
  Returning to the repeated game, backward inducting to period 1, note that a 




11 ,, max ( )
QPB R QP B −−    s.t. 
  (i)  11 1 () PBc Q u +− ≥  
  ( i i )   [ ] [ ] 1 11 2 22 22 1 () () ( 1 ) () ( ) PBc Q h PBc Q h Pc Q Pc qu +− + +− + − − ≥− +  
  (iii)  [ ] 11 1 22 11 () () () RQ P B RQ P RQ P δ δπ −−+ − ≥ −+   
where δ  the buyer’s discount factor and  1 δ < .  If the buyer does not discount the future, 
it is straightforward to show that he will always shirk on the bonus. For simplicity, 
assume that the seller does not discount.  Constraint (9i) is a participation constraint and 
constraints (9ii & 9iii) are dynamic incentive constraints or self-enforcement constraints.  
If these constraints are satisfied, then it would be sequentially rational for both buyer and 
seller to honor their contractual obligations.  In particular, even selfish buyers will mimic 
cooperative buyers in the first period to preserve their reputation.  If a selfish buyer shirks 
on the bonus, then the seller would update her belief in period 2 and know with certainty 
that the buyer is selfish and would not deliver quality in the second period.   
  The solution for (9) can be obtained by first substitution second period optimal 
price and bonus (6) and (8) into constraints (9i) and (9ii).  Then assuming both 
constraints bind with equality, one can obtain the solutions, 
(10)       1 () () B cQ cq =−  
(11)  1 () Puc q =+   
These can be substituted into constraint (9iii) and then solving for δ yields (assume 
constraint binds), 11 
 












Expression (12) gives us the lower bound on the discount factor for which a selfish buyer 
will honor its bonus in the first period (i.e. mimic cooperative types).  That is, selfish 
buyers mimic if  b δ δ ≥ .  Finally, substituting the optimal values for  1 P  and  1 B  into the 
objective function gives us the problem, 
(13)  () max ( ) ( )
Q R Qu c Q −−   
Which yields the first order Kuhn-Tucker condition  () () 0 RQ cQ ′ ′ − ≥ .  By assumption, 
() () R qc q ′′ ≥ , [,] qq q ∀∈ .  Hence, the optimal solution is a corner solution at Qq = .   
This discretionary bonus contract is ex post efficient as the buyer requests the highest 
level of quality and uses the incentive compatible self-enforcing bonus (6) to induce the 
seller to comply. 
  It is straightforward to show that, under reasonable conditions, buyers have 
incentives to design and offer a contract that is less ex ante efficient than the one just 
presented.  Suppose that the buyer offers an illusory promise which includes no 
enforceable terms.  The primary difference between the illusory promise and the 
discretionary bonus presented above is that the fixed price P  is also made discretionary 
so that the buyer can renege (refuse to pay).  If a purely self-interested buyer reneges, 
assume that he makes the most profitable deviation, which is  2 0 p = .  Real world 
examples of such contracts include cases where payment takes place after a job is 12 
 
complete or after delivery. This exposes the seller to significant counter-party risk as it 
provides the buyer with an option to rent-seek. 
  One can proceed with the analysis of illusory promises using the same steps as 
before.  Starting with the last mover in the last period, note that a selfish buyer will 
renege on both the bonus and  2 P .  Backward inducting to the seller’s move, we can 
modify (4) to determine whether the seller will deliver the promised quality.  Inequality 
(4) is modified to, 
(4*)   [ ] [ ] 22 2 2 2 ()( 1 ) () ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) hP B cQ h cQ hP cq h cq ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ +− + −− ≥ − + − − ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  
This inequality can be used to solve for the incentive compatible bonus, which turns out 
to be identical to (6).  The seller will accept the contract if, 
(7*)  [ ] [ ] 22() ( 1 ) () hP B cQ h cQ u +− + −− ≥  









Comparing (8*) to (8), it is clear that the promised price must be raised to compensate for 




11 1 ,, max ( )
QPB R QP B −−   s . t .  
(i)    11 1 () PBc Q u +− ≥  
 (ii) 
[ ] [ ] 11 1 22 1 1 1 () () ( 1 ) () ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) PBc Q h PBc Q h c Q h Pc q h c q u ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ +− + +− + − − ≥ − + − − + ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  13 
 
 (iii)  [ ] 11 1 1 1 () () () RQ P B RQ RQ δ δπ −−+ ≥ +   
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It is also straightforward to show that, like the discretionary bonus contract, the buyer 
will request the highest level of quality, Qq = .  Thus, the illusory promise is ex post 
efficient although it will be shown that is not as ex ante efficient as the discretionary 
bonus contract.   
  Finally, the RPM optimal solution can be derived by backward induction.  Note 
that under the RPM, the buyer is committing to pay a fixed price  P under all 
contingencies so that the buyer has no ex post discretion.  However, since Q is not 
enforceable, the seller has the discretion to choose q<Q.  Thus, after the contract is 
signed, the seller is the last mover.  Assume that selfish sellers will choose qq =  
regardless of the level of P and Q specified in the contract whereas cooperative sellers 
will always honor the contract after accepting the contract.  Assume that the buyer’s 
beliefs about the proportional of cooperative sellers is also h.  Then in the second period, 
the buyer solves the  following contract design problem: 14 
 
(14)  () ( )
22
22 2 , max ( ) (1 ) ( )
QPhRQ P h Rq P −+ − −   22 () Pc Q u − ≥  
That is, the buyer maximizes her expected profits subject to cooperative sellers accepting 
the contract.  Selfish sellers’ participation constraints will not bind since they will earn 
positive rents for any  2 () PP u c q >= +    which is necessarily the case if the buyer wants to 
induce cooperative sellers to choose  22 qQq = > .  Letting the participation constraint 
bind, and substituting into the objective function yields, 
(15)  () ( )
2
22 2 max ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
Q h RQ u cQ h Rq u cQ −− +− −−   
which yields the first order condition, 
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− ′  is sufficiently large, which is the case if h is small (buyer 
pessimistic), then  2 Qq < .  Given a  2 Q  that satisfies (16), the optimal price is, 
(17)  22 () Pu c Q =+   
Note that the selfish type will always earn rents under this contract since the selfish seller 
will only deliver q.  This inefficiency causes the buyer to hedge her risk of encountering 
selfish sellers by reducing the level of quality requested to below q . 
  Moving back to period 1, the contract design problem is, 
(18)  () ( )
11
11 11 , max ( ) (1 ) ( )
QPh R QP h R QP −+ − −  s.t.  
   11 () Pc Q u −≥   15 
 
   11 2 1 () ( ) ( ) Pc Q Pc q Pc q u −+ − ≥ − +  
where the second constraint is the selfish seller’s dynamic incentive constraint.  When 
this constraint is satisfied, then the selfish seller will mimic the cooperative seller in the 
first period and honor the contract.  Note that (17) can be substituted into the constraint 
and after canceling and rearranging terms, the constraint reduces to  21 () () cQ cQ ≥ , which 
implies, 
(19)  21 QQ ≥  
That is, the expected second period output (and hence  2 P ) must be sufficiently high to 
induce the selfish seller to delay her shirking decision until the second period.  If she 
shirks in the first period, then the buyer will know with certainty that she is a selfish type 
and would not offer her  2 P  in the second period.  Consequently, for a sufficiently high 
2 P , even selfish sellers prefer to honor the contract in the first period.  Assuming that (19) 
binds, the optimal first period contract is identical to the second period contract, which is 
characterized by (16) and (17).  An important point to note is that this contract is 






− ′  in (16) which drives a wedge between first and 
second best quality.  The reason for this is that the buyer always has to pay the selfish 
seller a premium to induce her to cooperate in the first period. 
  The above solutions can be used to generate several propositions: 
Proposition 2:  Buyers prefer contracts that provide buyers with discretionary latitude.  
That is, buyers prefer the illusory promise to the discretionary bonus, and the 
discretionary bonus to the RPM. 16 
 
Proposition 2 is straightforward to show.  Just substitute the optimal solutions (10) and 
(11) into the buyer’s objective function in (9) to obtain profit under the bonus contract, 
() () b R Qc Qu π =− − .  Similarly, substitute (10*) and (11*) into the objective function in 
(9*) to obtain profit under the illusory promise,  () () () I R Qc Qc q π = −+.  It is obvious 
that  Ib π π > .   The profit under the RPM can be obtained by noting that the optimal 
quality consistent with (16), along with (17) can be substituted into the objective function 
(18) to obtain  ( ) ( ) RPM RPM RPM RQ u cQ π =− −  .  Since this is identical to the profit for the 
bonus, contract with the exception that  RPM Q  is lower, it must be the case that  bR P M π π > .  
Hence, buyers also prefer contracts that leave their payment obligations discretionary. 
Proposition 3:  Buyers are more likely to break promises and engage in rent-seeking 
under the more discretionary contracts. 
To show this, compare the threshold discount factors (12) and (12*).  Note that 
[ ]
[]
() () () () () ()
() () () () () ()
Ib
cq u RQ cQ u cQ cq cQ u




⎡⎤ +− − − − + ⎣⎦ −= − =
−− − − ⎡⎤ − −− − ⎣⎦
  
   
.  Note that 
all terms in brackets are strictly positive under our modeling 
assumption ( ) ( ) RQ cQ u π −− −  >0 for Qq = .  Therefore  IB δ δ > .  Consequently, there is 
a smaller set of discount factors that will discipline selfish buyers under illusory 
promises.  Under illusory promises, selfish buyers are less likely to mimic cooperative 
buyers and are more likely to engage in rent seeking.  One can also see from equation 
(7*) that if a buyer reneges, the seller earns  () cQ −  ex post which is less than her 
reservation payoff of u  .  Hence, even in the absence of ex post inefficiency, sellers can 17 
 
be made substantially worse off than if they did not contract in the first place.  Under the 
RPM, the buyer retains no discretionary latitude so her unwillingness to break promises is 
trivially satisfied. 
Proposition 4: When buyer market power is increased, sellers’ willingness to accept all 
contracts increases. 
To show this, suppose that there are m buyers and n sellers where  1
m
n
<  so that there is 
concentration in favor of buyers.  That is, there will be sellers left without contracts.  If 
the seller rejects a contract, then there is a (1 / ) mn −  probability that she will not obtain 
another contract.  Hence, her reservation utility must be modified so that 
ˆ (1 / )
m
uu m n u
n
=+ −   where u  represents the scrap value of unemployed production 
assets.  Note that  ˆ uu >   so that concentration effectively decreases the reservation utility 
making it more likely that a seller will accept a given contract.   A particularly interesting 
aspect of Proposition 4 is that concentration can potentially increase ex ante efficiency by 
increasing sellers’ willingness to engage in trade.  However, there is a dark side to this 
story, which is that, given sellers greater willingness to accept contracts, buyers’ may 
offer more illusory promises so that the net efficiency effect of concentration is unclear.  
What is clear is that rent-seeking will increase.  Indeed, it is not out of the realm of 
possibility to envision greater efficiency and lower seller welfare due to more rent-
seeking.  18 
 
Proposition 5: Both self-enforcing illusory promises and contracts that provide buyers 
with partial discretion (e.g. discretionary bonus) are ex post efficient.  Contracts that 
leave buyers with no discretion may not be ex post efficient. 
Proposition 5 follows from the fact that the buyer requests Qq =  under both illusory 
promise and discretionary bonus contracts.  However, buyers request a lower level of 
quality under RPM contracts. 
Proposition 6: The illusory promise is less ex ante efficient than contracts that provide 
buyers with partial discretion. 
Proposition 6 follows from the fact that sellers are less likely to accept illusory promises 
which potentially decreases the number of trades.  Under our assumptions, trade creates 
social surplus so a decrease in seller acceptance implies ex ante inefficiency.  To show 
this, simply substitute the optimal solutions (10) and (11) into the seller’s objective 
function (9i) to obtain,  b uu = .  Similarly, substituting (10*) and (11*) into (9*i) yields, 
() I uc q =− .  It is clear that  bI uu >  and therefore, sellers prefer the discretionary bonus 
contract.  Moreover, by Proposition 5, the two contracts are both ex post efficient.  Thus, 
the lower acceptance rate of illusory promises implies that it must be less ex ante efficient 
than the discretionary bonus contract. 
  While we only provide an analytic model for three types of contracts, our 
experimental design allows subjects to endogenize a large set of contracts.  For example, 
some contracts are allowed to incorporate a deduct, D, rather than a bonus.  Other 
contracts may omit Q altogether so that subjects do not explicitly communicate a quality 
request.  Explicitly modeling these possibilities is conceptually straightforward, though 19 
 
tedious, but would not add additional insights and therefore are omitted .  The main point 
of propositions 2-6 would continue to hold under these additional contracts.  
Experimental Design 
The basic experimental platform will allow parties to choose the contractual form 
endogenously subject to exogenously imposed limits to contract enforcement.  Both 
relational contracts and one-shot contracts are endogenously nested in the design.  The 
advantage of this platform is that it allows us to examine how the institutional 
environment will affect both contract choice as well as efficiency and distribution.  We 
also compare two additional treatments, one without market power where there is a 
balanced number of buyers and sellers and one with buyer market power where there are 
fewer buyers than sellers.  The market power treatments were conducted for both the 
perfect enforcement and the imperfect enforcement treatments.  Table 1 outlines the set 
of treatments. 
In each experimental session, subjects were randomly assigned to be buyers 
(principals who proposed and offered contracts) and sellers (agents who can accept or 
reject contracts).  The laboratory had room for twelve subjects per-session and a session 
was conducted if a minimum of six subjects showed up.  A total of 342 subjects 
participated in 38 sessions. A typical session is comprised of 15 identical trading periods 
to enable repeated game effects. Thus, the total number of possible trades per-session is 
15 multiplied by ½ the number of subjects in the non-market power treatments (RS1 and 
RS2).  For example, if 12 subjects participated, there were six buyer and six sellers so 
there were six possible trades per round and 90 possible trades for the entire session.  20 
 
Since not all sessions included twelve subjects, a total of 1290 trades were possible 
across the 18 non-market power sessions. In the market power sessions (RS1B and 
RS2B), there were typically fewer buyers than sellers.  When there were an even number 
of subjects, there was typically two more sellers than buyers.  For odd numbers of 
subjects, there was one more seller than buyer. There were a total of 72 subjects who 
participated in the market power sessions resulting in a total of 1080 possible trades. 
Within each of the 15 trading periods in each session, any buyer can trade with any seller 
although each buyer and seller was only allowed one trade per-round.  Some sellers and 
buyers did not trade either because they did not reach contractual agreements or they 
decided not to trade for that period.   
In each period, buyers and sellers trade one unit of a “good” which varies in 
quality.  Higher quality increases buyers’ revenues.  But producing higher quality also 
increases sellers’ costs. A buyer thus tries to induce high quality via a contract (a mutual 
promise, which may be enforceable) which specifies price and quality.  The key 
institutional factor that we varied is the degree to which quality is verifiable and 
enforceable by a third-party.  If quality is enforceable, then the parties can write a 
contract that stipulates a promised level of quality and to make it “binding.”  A binding 
quality offer is analogous to a perfectly legally enforceable term – this term was enforced 
by the computer.  In other words, if the parties agreed on terms and made them binding, 
they had no discretionary latitude to deviate from terms after agreeing to a contract.  In 
RS1 and RS1B, quality can be perfectly and costlessly enforced.  Therefore, quality can 
be directly specified in a contract and made binding in RS1.  In RS2 and RS2B, quality 21 
 
cannot be enforced and cannot be made binding.  The buyer may still choose to include 
quality in the contract, but it cannot be made binding so that the seller is free to deviate 
from promised quality.  The buyer must find informal ways, such as relational 
contracting, to ensuring that the seller delivers on promised quality.   
    After receiving approval from the local institutional review board, subjects were 
recruited from an e-mail list comprised of thousands of random draws from the entire 
student population of a large public university in the Midwest.  The recruitment message 
described the activity as an economic decision making experiment, announced the length 
of the experiment to be about two hours, and provided information concerning the 
minimum ($5) and typical range of payments ($12 to $35) for participation. Only subjects 
naïve to this protocol were enrolled and the protocol featured no subject deception.  The 
experiment was programmed using “z-tree” software (Fischbacher 2007).  Subjects were 
also asked to fill out short questionnaires, which took anywhere from five to twenty 
minutes to complete, to test subjects’ understanding of experimental instructions and to 
obtain information about subject characteristics (e.g. demographics, GPA, etc.).  Subjects 
were informed that actual earnings depend upon the rules of the game and the 
participant’s and other participants’ actions.  In addition, subjects started each contracting 
experiment with $5 in their account balance in an addition to the $7 in show-up fee.  
Average earnings were in the neighborhood of $22 per subject per session. The fifteen 
periods of each contracting session took between 40 to 70 minutes to complete. 
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We now describe in detail the specifics of how buyers (principals) and sellers (agents) 
carried out their trades within each trading period.  Each period represents the stage-game 
of a 15 period repeated game.  Thus, each session can be considered an individual 15-
period finitely repeated game. The sequence of events in a stage-game is as follows: 
1.  Trading phase: Buyer specifies a contract, which may include a quality request, 
Q, a promised fixed price, P,  and/or a bonus/deduct, B/D conditional on quality 
outcomes. In RS1 and RS1B, the buyer may also specify whether all terms are 
binding.  Binding terms are enforced by the computer.   In RS2 and RS2B, quality 
cannot be enforced and made binding.  Hence, bonus/deducts, which depend on 
quality, also cannot be made binding.  Only P can be made binding.  The buyer 
may also choose to omit terms, such as Q, P, and/or B/D. The buyer can offer as 
many contracts as time permits (2 minutes) but can only trade with one seller per-
period.
 1  After a contract is specified, the buyer can offer the contract either as a 
private contract to a specific seller or a public offer that any seller in the 
marketplace can accept.   If a private offer is made, only the seller receiving the 
offer is informed of the terms of the offer.  Public offers are displayed to all other 
buyers and sellers.  Private offers enable cooperation and long-term relationships 
to form, which lie at the core of relational contracting.  For instance, if a buyer 
predicts benefits from contracting with a specific seller, the buyer can make a 
private offer to that seller rather than venture into the open market and hoping that 
                                                            
1 Pilot tests were conducted by allowing for 2.5 minutes (150 seconds).  However, we observed that most of 
the offers were completed within a minute and a half so we shortened the trading phase to reduce the length 
of the experiment.  23 
 
that seller is the first to accept the offer.  Sellers can only accept or reject offers.  
A buyer can make as many offers as desired in the trading phase, but once one 
offer is accepted, all other offers are withdrawn and no additional offers can be 
made.  Similarly, once a seller accepts an offer, no other offers can be entertained. 
No buyers (sellers) are obligated to make (accept) offers during the trading phase. 
2.  Quality Determination Phase: Once a seller accepts a contract, s/he chooses the 
quality, q, to supply.  Note that  q denotes actual quality and Q denotes promised 
quality in the contract.   If Q  was specified as binding in the contract (RS1 and 
RS2B only), the computer ensures that the seller delivers q=Q.  That is, the seller 
has no discretionary latitude to deviate.  If Q was specified, but was not made 
binding, then the seller can choose qQ ≠ . While sellers were deciding on q, 
buyers were asked to specify what quality level they expect the sellers to supply 
and how certain they are that these expectations would be fulfilled. 
3.  Price Determination Phase: The buyer observes quality before making payments.  
If P is binding, the buyer has no discretionary latitude to deviate from the 
contractually specified price.  If the fixed price is not binding, then the buyer can 
choose a an actual price, p, such that  p P ≠ .  If bonuses/deducts are specified and 
made binding, then the computer ensures that the bonus/deduct is paid depending 
on whether quality obligations are met/not met.  If bonuses/deducts are specified 
but not binding, then these become discretionary bonuses/deducts. While buyers 
were making their decision on p and bonuses/deducts, sellers specify what 
price/bonus/deduct they expect their buyers to choose and how certain they were 24 
 
that the expectations will be fulfilled.  Finally, income is calculated and the period 
ends.  Each buyer knew what she and her seller made during the period, but did 
not know the earnings of other buyers and sellers in the market. 
During the experiments, all trading takes place on networked computers enclosed 
in cubicles to eliminate between-subject visual contact.  Anonymity is further preserved 
by assigning all subjects identification (ID) numbers.  ID numbers are fixed across 
periods allowing subjects to develop and track reputations.  In addition to the 15 periods, 
two practice periods were conducted prior to the “live” rounds.  In order to minimize 
strategic carry-over from the practice to live rounds, all buyers and sellers were told that 
their ID numbers would be re-assigned after the practice rounds.    
It is important to note that our experiment is a finitely repeated game.  In theory, 
when the ending round is common knowledge and if it is common knowledge that all 
subjects are strictly self interested, then cooperation should not occur in any round.  In 
this case, the one-shot predictions should hold in all fifteen rounds.  Nevertheless, the 
theoretical model outlined earlier that postulates that the subject pool is a mixture of 
cooperative and selfish types, along with a number of past studies, have shown that 
cooperation still occurs in the early to middle rounds of finitely repeated games and only 
begin to breakdown near the ending period (e.g. Axelrod 1981; Andreoni and Miller 
1993; Brown, Falk and Fehr 2004, Healy 2007, among others).  Many of these 
experiments show that cooperation does occur and only begins to decline in rounds close 
to the end.   
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The economic model is based on the theoretical model outline earlier.  However, in order 
to implement the model for experimental purposes, it has to be parameterized.  We 
parameterize our model as follows:  () 1 0 R qq = ,  0 π = , u =10,  1 q =  and  10 q = .  
Moreover, we assume that  () cq is represented by the cost schedule outline in Table 2. 
Note that marginal cost never exceeds “3” and the buyer’s marginal revenue is always 
“10”.  Thus, marginal revenue always exceeds marginal cost, as was assumed in the 
theoretical model, so it would be socially efficient for parties to trade at  10 qq == . 
  Round specific payouts are determined for buyers as follows: 
(20)  π = 
10 ( ) (1 )                      if an agreement is reached, 
0                                                          if no agreement is reached,




where I is an indicator variable that takes the value of “1” if a bonus was chosen instead 
of a deduct.  All payments are given in experimental points where subjects earn one 
dollar for 50 points.  The seller’s profit is: 
(21)  U = 
( ) (1 ) ( )                            if an agreement is reached, 
10                                                         if no agreement is reached,
pI b I d c q
u
++ − − ⎧
⎨ = ⎩
 
All subjects were told that they would earn experimental “profits” based on the payoff 
functions (20) and (21).   
Results 
Propositions 1-6 provide a number of important predictions concerning subject behavior 
under various treatments.  To recap, these propositions predict that buyers prefer 
increasingly discretionary contracts, that greater rent seeking is likely to occur under 
more discretionary contracts, that contracts that permit greater discretionary latitude to 26 
 
buyers are less ex ante efficient in the sense that sellers are more likely to reject them, 
and that increasing buyer market power increases sellers’ willingness to accept contracts 
which may imply that buyers will offer more discretionary contracts, which in turn, may 
lead to more rent seeking. 
  Given the number of options that the experimental design allows, it would be 
helpful to discuss some of the contract types that are allowable.  The experimental design 
places very few restrictions on the types of contracts that can be offered.  Buyers can 
design up to 45 different contracts in RS1 and RS1B, and up to 21 possible contracts in 
RS2 and RS2B.  This is a formidable number of contracts to analyze individually so we 
group our contracts into a few broad categories that facilitate analysis of the propositions. 
•  Complete Contracts: Neither party has discretionary latitude to deviate from the 
contractual obligations.  For example (P, Q,B/D) are all binding. 
•  Buyer discretionary contracts with no seller discretion: Contracts that make the 
sellers’ obligation binding (Q binding), but leave the buyer with some discretion 
on payment (e.g. P and/or B/D are discretionary). 
•  Seller discretionary contracts with no buyer discretion: Contracts that make all of 
the buyers’ obligations binding but leave some discretion for the seller to deviate 
from quality obligations (e.g. RPM). 
•  Seller discretion with partial buyer discretion contracts: Sellers’ obligation (Q) 
not binding and buyer’s payment partially binding. E.g. Binding P combined with 
discretionary bonuses or deducts. 27 
 
•  Full discretionary contracts: Contracts with no binding terms so both buyer and 
seller have full discretion.  These are informal “handshake” agreements or illusory 
promises. 
•  Null contract: Do not specify any obligations.  Akin to spot transactions. 
Note that contracts that leave the seller with no discretion (Q binding) are only available 
in RS1/RS1B.  In RS1/RS1B, a third-party can perfectly monitor and enforce quality, but 
in RS2/RS2B, the court cannot monitor or enforce quality.  Contracts can only restrict 
actions and not strategies (complete plans of action for all possible contingencies).  If 
quality can be monitored and enforced by a third party, then it is possible to either write a 
complete contract that directly specifies Q and makes it binding, or to condition bonuses 
or deducts on q.   
  Recall that Proposition 1 predicts that the optimal contract in RS1/RS1B is a 
complete contract that is fully efficient and leaves sellers with no rents above their 
reservation profits.  Proposition 2 predicts that, buyers prefer contracts that allow for 
more discretionary latitude in RS2/RS2B.  Table 3 reports summary statistics on contract 
data for the RS1 and RS1B treatments.  Examining both the number of contracts offered 
and the number of trades that took place under the various contracts (number of accepted 
contracts), it appears that the patterns are broadly consistent with Propositions 1 and 2.  
In particular, under RS1, over 50% of offers were complete contracts, which resulted in 
55% of trades taking place under complete contracts.  Interestingly, when buyers did not 
specify complete contracts, they were most likely to specify contracts that left them with 
discretion but tied down the obligations of sellers (made Q binding).  Indeed 35% of 28 
 
offers were made under buyer discretionary/no seller discretion contracts and 33% of 
trades took place under these contracts.  Buyers were unlikely to select other types of 
contracts.  Hence, it appears that buyers were reluctant to leave sellers with any 
discretion.  This is not surprising considering that buyers earned higher profits under 
contracts that tied down the sellers’ obligations.      
  Under RS2, where the enforcement of Q is imperfect, buyers cannot tie down 
sellers’ obligations so that sellers are inevitably left with some discretion.  Then 
Proposition 2 predicts that buyers will prefer highly discretionary contracts.  Bernheim 
and Whinston (1999) point out that when one party to a contract is left with discretion, it 
may be optimal to leave the other party with discretion in order to provide informal or 
strategic incentives.  The summary data in Table 4 appear to be consistent with this 
prediction as buyers overwhelmingly made illusory promises which left them with 
maximum discretion (66%).  This resulted in 55% of trades being executed using illusory 
promises.  Buyers also preferred partially discretionary contracts (23% of offers resulting 
in 33% actual trades) to contracts that tied down their payment obligations (10% of offers 
leading to 11% of actual trades).   A Wilcoxon Sign Rank
2 test used to determine whether 
the differences in percentage across contracts were statistically significant using each 
session as one independent observation confirmed differences across contract types 
(p<0.01).  Thus, the preliminary data patterns appear to be consistent with the prediction 
of the theoretical model.   
                                                            
2 This is a non-parametric alternative to the t-test for correlated samples.   29 
 
  Proposition 4 predicts that when buyers have market power, then sellers’ 
willingness to accept all classes of contracts should increase.  A corollary prediction of 
proposition 4 might be that sellers will accept contracts with less favorable terms, such as 
contracts that have lower payments and/or provide more discretion to buyers, Indeed, the 
results in Tables 3 and 4 appear to be consistent with these predictions.  Comparing RS1 
results to RS1B results, note that acceptance rates appear to increase when market power 
is added, although there does not appear to be a major increase in the number of 
discretionary contracts used to execute trades.  However, comparing RS2 to RS2B, it is 
obvious that market power has a substantial impact on contract choice.  Note that 
acceptance rates dramatically increased across all classes of contracts.  Moreover, the 
number of trades that were executed under illusory promises increased from 55% to 69%.  
In order to examine this issue formally, regression 1 in Table 5 presents the results of a 
probit regression using RS2/RS2B data where the dependent variable is a dummy that 
takes a value of “1” if a contract was accepted by a seller.  The right hand side variables 
include contract types and an RS2B dummy along with interaction terms to determine the 
impact of market power.  The base category is RS2 and the seller discretionary contract 
with no buyer discretion (e.g. RPM style contracts).  There are two important results to 
note from this regression and they are highlighted below. 
Result 1: Illusory promises reduce the probability of acceptance (relative to the base 
case) by 0.116 (p<0.05). 
Result 2: An increase in market power generally increases the probability that a seller 
will accept a given contract. 30 
 
Result 2 follows from the fact that the marginal effect of the RS2B coefficient is 0.428 
(p<0.00) while at the same time, the interaction terms involving RS2B and a contract 
type are either not significant, or are only significant at the 10% level.  Hence, sellers 
increased their willingness to accept seller discretion/no buyer discretion contracts but 
did not change their relative willingness to accept other contracts.  Thus, it appears that 
sellers increased their willingness to accept all classes of contracts when market power is 
added. 
  Regression (2) of Table 5 provides insights into why buyers tend to gravitate 
toward more discretionary contracts particularly when market power is added.  Note that 
the dependent variable is buyer profits and we would anticipate that if buyers are profit 
maximizers, they would choose the contract with the greatest impact on profits.   The 
following result is highlighted. 
Result 3: In RS2, more discretionary contracts increase profits to the buyer relative to the 
seller discretion/no buyer discretion contract.  
Result 3 follows from the fact that the coefficients on the PBS and IP contracts are large, 
positive, and significant (p<0.001).   
  Proposition 3 predicts that buyers are more likely to break promises and engage in 
rent-seeking under more discretionary contracts.  Regression 4 allows us to explore this 
hypothesis further.  The dependent variable takes a value of “1” if a seller earned profits 
below her reservation level.   
Result 4: Illusory promises increase the probability that a seller will earn lower profits 
than her reservation profits. 31 
 
Result 4 follows from the fact that the marginal effect is 0.27 and significant (p<0.00).  
Note that adding market power appears to also increase the probability of seller losses as 
the marginal effect on the RS2B dummy is 0.23.  However, this coefficient is 
significantly different from zero only at the 10% level.   
  The censored regressions in table 6 are useful for investigating the predictions 
made in propositions 5 and 6.  Regressions (1) and (3) use ex post surplus as dependent 
variables where ex post surplus is defined as  10 BS U π + −  since “10” is what a seller 
receives if she does not trade.  The profits  B π  and  S U are actual profits generated after a 
contract has been accepted. These profits monotonically increasing in quality, q.  Ex ante 
surplus refers to expected surplus and is defined as  ( 10) BS pU π + −  where p is the 
probability that an offer is accepted.  Note that if a contract offer is rejected, then the 
surplus is zero.  Thus, the way the dependent variable is defined for ex ante surplus is,  
(22)      
10  contract offer is accepted
    








The regressions were conducted both with (regressions 3 and 4) and without (regressions 
1 and 2) contract terms included.  Strictly speaking, Proposition 5 should be tested using 
regression 1 which does not include contract terms.  This is because efficiency is driven 
by contract terms (e.g. level of Q and P), which in turn, depend on contract type.  Hence, 
contract terms are endogenous to contract type. However, including contract terms can 
provide some insights into the factors that drive some contract types to be more efficient 
than others. 32 
 
Result 5: Both illusory promises (IP) and contracts that provide buyers with partial 
discretion (PBS) are more efficient than contracts that provide buyers with no discretion.  
Moreover, there is no significant difference in ex post efficiency between IP and PBS 
contracts. 
Result 5 follows from regression 1 where both the PBS and IP coefficients are positive 
and significantly different from zero (p<0.00)  which implies that both PBS and IP 
contracts generate more surplus than the base, no-buyer-discretion contract.  This 
continues to hold when market power is added as the coefficient for PBS + RS2B×PBS is 
positive and significant (p<0.05) and the coefficient for IP +RS2B×IP is also positive and 
significant, though only at the 10% level.  These results imply that the PBS and IP 
contracts are more ex post efficient than the base contract with and without market 
power.   The test for the equality of coefficients for the PBS and IP contracts shows no 
significant difference (p=0.61).  However, under market power, equality is rejected at 
10% (p=0.06).  Thus, overall, there is tentative support for Proposition 5.  
Result 6: There is tentative evidence that the illusory promise is less ex ante efficient than 
contracts that provide buyers with partial discretion. 
  Proposition 6 can be examined using regression 2.  First, note that the coefficient 
for PBS is larger than for IP.  A test for equality, however, rejects equality at only the 
10% level (p=0.06).  The same test conducted with market power, which involves testing 
the equality of PBS + RS2B×PBS and IP +RS2B×IP also rejects equality at the 10% level 
(p=0.09).  These results provide tentative support for Proposition 6. 
Conclusion 33 
 
The preliminary results seem to support the theoretical model which predicts that, when 
buyers have the option of choosing discretionary contracts, they tend to favor these 
contracts in order to extract rents from the other party.  This situation is exacerbated 
when buyer market power is added.  When sellers are on the long side of the market so 
that some sellers will be unemployed, sellers are more willing to accept contracts.  This 
provides buyers with greater freedom to structure contracts that are stacked in their favor.  
These contracts increase buyer profits but also increases the incidence of rent-seeking 
where sellers may earn profits below reservation levels.  Efficiency-wise, when contracts 
are not third-party enforceable so that buyers always have discretion, then contracts that 
provide buyers with partial discretion are more efficient than contracts that provide 





Andreoni, J.A., and J.H. Miller. 1993. “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated  
Prisoner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence,” Economic Journal, 103: 570-85. 
Axelrod, R. 1981. “The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists,” American Journal  
of Political Science, 34: 306-18. 
Bernheim, B., and M.D. Whinston. 1998. “Incomplete Contracts and Strategic  
Ambiguity,” American Economic Review, 88: 902-932. 
Brown, M., A. Falk, and E. Fehr. 2004. “Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market  
Interactions,” Econometrica, 72: 747-780. 
Fischbacher, U. 2007. “ Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic  
 Experiments,”  Experimental Economics 10: 171-178.  
Healy, P.J. 2007. “Group Reputations, Stereotypes and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor  
 Market,”  American Economic Review, 92: 1751-1773. 
Kreps, D.M.; Milgrom, P.; Roberts, J. and Wilson, R. 1982. “Rational Cooperation in the  
  Finitely Repeated Presoners’ Dilemma.” Journal of Economic Theory, 27: 245- 
 252. 
MacDonald, J., and S.Y. Wu. 2009. “Market Competition, Institutions, and Contracts”  
  Working Paper, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West  
 Lafayette,  IN. 35 
 
Table 1: Experimental treatments (names of treatments in boxes) 
  Perfect Contract 
Enforcement (q verifiable) 
Imperfect Contract 
Enforcement (q not 
verifiable) 
 









Table 2: Quality cost table 
Quality  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 




Table 3: Contract Offers, Acceptance Rates, Surplus and Distribution in RS1 and 
RS1B 
  Number 
offered 
(% of total) 
Number 
Accepted 

































































38%  89% 42.51 40.42 34.22 43.94 18.30  6.48  35%  52% 














63% 68% 50.18  40.81  37.92 44.3 22.25 6.51 35%  66.7% 







0% 50%  0  4.5  0  14  10  0.5  0  100 












62.31 61.73 44.71 56.37 27.60 15.36  10%  24% 
*This category applies only to RS1 and RS1B.  These contracts are not available in RS2 and RS2B due to 
limits to enforcement. 37 
 
Table 4: Contract Offers, Acceptance Rates, Surplus and Distribution in RS2 and 
RS2B 
  Number 
offered 
(% of total) 
Number 
Accepted 












  RS2 RS2B RS2 RS2B RS2 RS2B RS2 RS2B RS2 RS2B RS2 RS2B RS2 RS2B 
Complete* 
 


































66%  80%  48.1  54.72 28.12 37.38 29.97 27.34  3%  14% 














39%  74% 53.55 50.34 40.99 47.94 22.56  12.4  23%  45% 









6% 40%  50  27.5  34 27.17 26 10.33  0  67% 
Total  1275  699  588  497  46%  71%  49.37  50.6  33.85 43.89 25.52 16.71  14%  36% 
*This category applies only to RS1 and RS1B.  These contracts are not available in RS2 and RS2B due to 







Table 5: Regressions examining the impact of contract type competition 
  Dependent Variable 





GLS with Buyer 
Profit as Dep. Var. 
 
(3) 
GLS with Seller 












































































Omitted due to 
perfect collinearity 
















Sum of coefficients 







Sum of coefficients 
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2(1) χ Test for the 




   19.64 
(p=0.00) 











R-square  0.108 0.118 0.187 0.144 
Note 1. Regressions have robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on sessions (in parentheses). For 
probits, reported coefficients are marginal effects (Δ probability for small change regressor). The base 
category is Seller discretionary contract with no buyer discretion and RS2.  
Note 2. ***,**,*Indicates the estimate is significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  There were 1974 obs. for regression (1) and 1111 obs. for the other three regressions. 
Note 3.*,**,*** signifies that coefficients are significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 39 
 
Table 6: Censored Regressions for Surplus in RS2 and RS2B 
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Sum of coefficients 










Sum of coefficients 










2(1) χ Test for the 





















N  1111 1974  1111  1974 
Note 1. Regressions are censored regressions with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on sessions 
in parentheses.  The base category is the fixed price contract.  Regressions also include period and period 
squared variables to control for learning effects over time. 
Note 2.*,**,*** signifies that coefficients are significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Note 3. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on sessions are contained in the parentheses below 
the coefficients. 
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